Unveiling the Stealthy Memory-Only Malware Exploiting Content Delivery Networks

On August 22, 2024, Mandiant released a detailed report on a newly discovered memory-only malware dubbed "PEAKLIGHT." This sophisticated malware employs a complex, multi-stage infection process, leveraging content delivery networks (CDNs) to distribute malicious payloads.

Unveiling the Stealthy Memory-Only Malware Exploiting Content Delivery Networks
The original image was generated by OpenAI's DALL-E and edited by the author. Source: OpenAI (August 2024)

Introduction

On August 22, 2024, Mandiant released a detailed report on a newly discovered memory-only malware dubbed "PEAKLIGHT." This sophisticated malware employs a complex, multi-stage infection process, leveraging content delivery networks (CDNs) to distribute malicious payloads. The malware is designed to evade traditional detection methods by operating entirely within memory, making it particularly dangerous and challenging to detect. PEAKLIGHT is part of a broader malware-as-a-service (MaaS) campaign delivering infostealers such as LUMMAC.V2, SHADOWLADDER, and CRYPTBOT.

Report Overview

Mandiant's Managed Defense team identified PEAKLIGHT during investigations into anomalous network activity within a client environment. The malware was initially distributed via malicious Microsoft Shortcut Files (LNKs) embedded within ZIP archives, disguised as pirated movie files. These LNK files acted as the initial infection vector, leading to downloading a memory-only JavaScript dropper from a CDN. This dropper subsequently executed a PowerShell-based downloader, now known as PEAKLIGHT, to fetch additional payloads.

The infection process of PEAKLIGHT is highly intricate, consisting of several stages.

  1. Stage 1: Movie Lures - Users were tricked into downloading ZIP files containing LNK files, which, when executed, connected to a CDN hosting an obfuscated JavaScript dropper.
  2. Stage 2: JavaScript Dropper - This memory-only dropper executed a PowerShell script to download and run additional malware from remote servers.
  3. Stage 3: PEAKLIGHT Downloader - The PowerShell script downloaded files from a CDN and saved them to specific directories on the infected machine. PEAKLIGHT then executed these files, which included various infostealers.
  4. Stage 4: Final Payload - The downloaded files contained malware components such as LUMMAC.V2, SHADOWLADDER, and CRYPTBOT, designed to exfiltrate sensitive data from the compromised system.

The PEAKLIGHT malware poses a significant threat due to its ability to operate entirely in memory, bypassing traditional file-based detection mechanisms. Organizations infected with PEAKLIGHT are at risk of data theft, as the malware is designed to steal credentials, personal information, and other sensitive data. The use of CDNs to host the malware's payloads further complicates detection, as traffic to these networks is often considered legitimate.

Insights and Analysis

The use of memory-only techniques and trusted content delivery networks highlights cybercriminals' evolving tactics. To counter such threats, defenders must adopt advanced detection methods that monitor in-memory activity.

To mitigate the risk posed by PEAKLIGHT, organizations should implement advanced endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions capable of monitoring in-memory activities. Regularly updating security software, conducting thorough network traffic analysis, and educating users about the dangers of downloading pirated content are critical steps in defending against this threat.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

IndicatorTypeDescription
hxxps://fatodex.b-cdn[.]net/fatodexURLNetwork-Based IOC associated with PEAKLIGHT downloader.
hxxps://matodown.b-cdn[.]net/matodownURLNetwork-Based IOC associated with PEAKLIGHT downloader.
hxxps://potexo.b-cdn[.]net/potexoURLNetwork-Based IOC associated with PEAKLIGHT downloader.
relaxtionflouwerwi[.]shopDomainCommand and control (C2) server used by LUMMAC.V2.
deprivedrinkyfaiir[.]shopDomainCommand and control (C2) server used by LUMMAC.V2.
detailbaconroollyws[.]shopDomainCommand and control (C2) server used by LUMMAC.V2.
messtimetabledkolvk[.]shopDomainCommand and control (C2) server used by LUMMAC.V2.
considerrycurrentyws[.]shopDomainCommand and control (C2) server used by LUMMAC.V2.
understanndtytonyguw[.]shopDomainCommand and control (C2) server used by LUMMAC.V2.
patternapplauderw[.]shopDomainCommand and control (C2) server used by LUMMAC.V2.
horsedwollfedrwos[.]shopDomainCommand and control (C2) server used by LUMMAC.V2.
tropicalironexpressiw[.]shopDomainCommand and control (C2) server used by LUMMAC.V2.
hxxp://gceight8vt[.]top/upload.phpURLCRYPTBOT C2 server URL.
hxxps://brewdogebar[.]com/code.vueURLCRYPTBOT C2 server URL.
hxxp://62.133.61[.]56/Downloads/Full%20Video%20HD%20(1080p).lnkURLSHADOWLADDER malware download URL.
hxxps://fatodex.b-cdn[.]net/K1.zipURLSHADOWLADDER malware download URL.
hxxps://fatodex.b-cdn[.]net/K2.zipURLSHADOWLADDER malware download URL.
hxxps://forikabrof[.]click/flkhfaiouwrqkhfasdrhfsa.pngURLSHADOWLADDER malware image download URL.
hxxps://matodown.b-cdn[.]net/K1.zipURLSHADOWLADDER malware download URL.
hxxps://matodown.b-cdn[.]net/K2.zipURLSHADOWLADDER malware download URL.
hxxps://nextomax.b-cdn[.]net/L1.zipURLSHADOWLADDER malware download URL.
hxxps://nextomax.b-cdn[.]net/L2.zipURLSHADOWLADDER malware download URL.
hxxps://potexo.b-cdn[.]net/K1.zipURLSHADOWLADDER malware download URL.
hxxps://potexo.b-cdn[.]net/K2.zipURLSHADOWLADDER malware download URL.
erefgojgbu (MD5: d6ea5dcdb2f88a65399f87809f43f83c)File Hash (MD5)File associated with CRYPTBOT malware.
L2.zip (MD5: 307f40ebc6d8a207455c96d34759f1f3)File Hash (MD5)Archive containing malware associated with CRYPTBOT.
Sеtup.exe (MD5: d8e21ac76b228ec144217d1e85df2693)File Hash (MD5)Executable identified as a variant of CRYPTBOT infostealer.
oqnhustu (MD5: 43939986a671821203bf9b6ba52a51b4)File Hash (MD5)File associated with LUMMAC.V2 infostealer.
WebView2Loader.dll (MD5: 58c4ba9385139785e9700898cb097538)File Hash (MD5)Malicious DLL used by LUMMAC.V2 infostealer.
Downloader (MD5: 95361f5f264e58d6ca4538e7b436ab67)File Hash (MD5)File associated with PEAKLIGHT downloader.
Downloader (MD5: b716a1d24c05c6adee11ca7388b728d3)File Hash (MD5)File associated with PEAKLIGHT downloader.
Aaaa.exe (MD5: b15bac961f62448c872e1dc6d3931016)File Hash (MD5)Executable associated with SHADOWLADDER malware.
bentonite.cfg (MD5: e7c43dc3ec4360374043b872f934ec9e)File Hash (MD5)Configuration file associated with SHADOWLADDER malware.
cymophane.doc (MD5: f98e0d9599d40ed032ff16de242987ca)File Hash (MD5)ISO file linked to SHADOWLADDER malware.
K1.zip (MD5: b6b8164feca728db02e6b636162a2960)File Hash (MD5)Archive containing malware associated with SHADOWLADDER.
K1.zip (MD5: bb9641e3035ae8c0ab6117ecc82b65a1)File Hash (MD5)Archive containing malware associated with SHADOWLADDER.
K2.zip (MD5: 236c709bbcb92aa30b7e67705ef7f55a)File Hash (MD5)Archive containing malware associated with SHADOWLADDER.
K2.zip (MD5: d7aff07e7cd20a5419f2411f6330f530)File Hash (MD5)Archive containing malware associated with SHADOWLADDER.
L1.zip (MD5: a6c4d2072961e9a8c98712c46be588f8)File Hash (MD5)Archive containing malware associated with SHADOWLADDER.
LiteSkinUtils.dll (MD5: 059d94e8944eca4056e92d60f7044f14)File Hash (MD5)Malicious DLL used by SHADOWLADDER malware.
toughie.txt (MD5: dfdc331e575dae6660d6ed3c03d214bd)File Hash (MD5)Configuration file associated with SHADOWLADDER malware.
WCLDll.dll (MD5: 47eee41b822d953c47434377006e01fe)File Hash (MD5)Malicious DLL associated with SHADOWLADDER malware.

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

TacticTechniqueIDDescription
ExecutionCommand and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShellT1059.001PowerShell is used to execute the PEAKLIGHT downloader script.
ExecutionSystem Binary Proxy Execution: MshtaT1218.005Mshta.exe is used to bypass application control and execute malicious code.
Defense EvasionObfuscated Files or InformationT1027PEAKLIGHT uses obfuscated JavaScript and PowerShell to evade detection.
Defense EvasionMasquerading: Match Legitimate Name or LocationT1036.005LNK files masquerade as legitimate movie files to deceive users.
Command and ControlExfiltration Over C2 ChannelT1041Stolen data is exfiltrated through HTTP/S connections to C2 servers.

References

PEAKLIGHT: Decoding the Stealthy Memory-Only Malware | Google Cloud Blog
Mandiant identified a new memory-only dropper using a complex, multi-stage infection process.