Unraveling AsyncRAT: A Deep Dive into Phishing Email Threats

On August 29, 2024, eSentire’s Threat Response Unit (TRU) released a bulletin detailing a recent investigation into an AsyncRAT infection delivered through phishing emails.

Unraveling AsyncRAT: A Deep Dive into Phishing Email Threats
The original image was generated by OpenAI's DALL-E and edited by the author. Source: OpenAI (August 2024)

Introduction

On August 29, 2024, eSentire's Threat Response Unit (TRU) released a bulletin detailing a recent investigation into an AsyncRAT infection delivered through phishing emails. The investigation revealed a sophisticated malware campaign leveraging Windows Script Files (.wsf) to distribute a remote access trojan (RAT) and an infostealer plugin, highlighting the persistent threat of email-based attacks.

Report Overview

The discovery of this malware campaign began in August 2024 when eSentire's TRU identified an infection stemming from the execution of a .wsf file. Although the original phishing email could not be retrieved, the TRU team assessed with high confidence that it contained a malicious archive as an attachment. The infection vector highlighted the ongoing risk posed by phishing emails as a method for delivering malware.

The initial payload was a .wsf file, named with a "SummaryForm_" prefix (MD5: 154cc0f462c85b494a45b7531f3a9f03). This file contained HTML character entities that triggered the download of a VBScript disguised as a text file from a remote server. Once downloaded, the script executed a series of actions to maintain persistence and facilitate further payloads.

  1. The VBScript utilized the Start-BitsTransfer command to download a file masquerading as an image, which was then saved as a ZIP file in the system'ssystem's Public directory. This ZIP file was extracted, and the VBScript was executed, initiating a chain of malicious scripts and batch files.
  2. The malware established persistence by creating a scheduled task named "MicrosoftEdgeUpdate500," which executed another VBScript every two minutes. This script, in turn, executed additional batch files and PowerShell scripts designed to deploy the AsyncRAT payload.
  3. The AsyncRAT payload was injected into the RegAsm.exe process using a DLL file (MD5: dcce5bc3e27295a1cbe13a411244fe93). The malware utilized obfuscated strings to bypass detection, ensuring the RAT could operate undetected.
  4. The RAT was equipped with an info stealer plugin that targeted browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, and Brave, as well as cryptocurrency wallet extensions like MetaMask and Binance. This plugin exfiltrated sensitive data, potentially compromising user credentials and financial information.

The infection's impact could be severe, especially for individuals and organizations with cryptocurrency assets or sensitive browser-stored data. By compromising multiple browsers and wallet extensions, the attackers could gain unauthorized access to financial accounts, leading to potential financial loss and data breaches. Process injection and obfuscation techniques also make detection and remediation more challenging, increasing the risk of prolonged exposure to the threat.

Insights and Analysis

This investigation into AsyncRAT and its infostealer plugin demonstrates the enduring danger of phishing emails and the sophisticated methods attackers use to compromise systems. Maintaining vigilance and adopting the recommended security measures are essential to protect against such threats. The TRU team emphasized the continuing threat of phishing emails as a vector for delivering sophisticated malware. Their analysis demonstrated attackers' evolving tactics to bypass security measures and achieve persistence within targeted systems. 

  • Ensure all devices are protected with Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions to detect and respond to malicious activities.
  • Implement Phishing and Security Awareness Training (PSAT) programs to educate employees on recognizing and avoiding phishing emails.
  • Modify the default ''open-with'' settings for script files to open with a basic text editor, reducing the risk of accidental execution.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

IndicatorTypeDescription
154cc0f462c85b494a45b7531f3a9f03File Hash (MD5)Hash of the malicious .wsf file named with a “SummaryForm_” prefix.
a332817fd302e05b131c7a7a0cdb1a04File Hash (MD5)Hash of the VBScript file fetched by the .wsf file.
c86280bd532eec707f106542a4458400File Hash (MD5)Hash of the image file masquerading as a ZIP file.
1eefdb23f7c63922756eafb532127b8eFile Hash (MD5)Hash of the VBS script executed by the malware.
ac0f2aa2c5caf791f0310c2c07a1e1c3File Hash (MD5)Hash of the batch file executed by the VBS script.
ec348cf15e839b8912862352bc916d22File Hash (MD5)Hash of the batch file executed by the second VBS script.
dcce5bc3e27295a1cbe13a411244fe93File Hash (MD5)Hash of the “NewPE2.dll” file used for process hollowing in RegAsm.exe.
315bc30cd580b750b4afc294fa38a8bcFile Hash (MD5)Hash of the PowerShell script creating a scheduled task for persistence.
hxxp://104.243.37[.]35:222/bfbupdeuiterborm/uzopuzbkrpcziwca.txtURLURL from which the VBScript is downloaded.
hxxp://104.243.37[.]35:222/bfbupdeuiterborm/lAOdPuUqwXLVFvqT.jpgURLURL from which the ZIP file masquerading as an image is downloaded.

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

TacticTechniqueIDDescription
ExecutionScriptingT1059.001Using a script (e.g., VBScript) to execute malware on the system.
PersistenceScheduled Task/JobT1053.005Creating a scheduled task to run malicious scripts for persistence.
Defense EvasionObfuscated Files or InformationT1027Obfuscating strings and script contents to avoid detection.
Privilege EscalationProcess InjectionT1055.012Injecting malicious code into a legitimate process (RegAsm.exe) to evade defenses.
CollectionInput CaptureT1056Capturing input data (e.g., credentials) using an infostealer plugin.

References

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