North Korean Cyber Threat Groups Unleash New Malware Arsenal in 2024

On September 9, 2024, Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 released a detailed threat assessment outlining the activities of various North Korean cyber threat groups operating under the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB).

North Korean Cyber Threat Groups Unleash New Malware Arsenal in 2024
The original image was generated by OpenAI's DALL-E and edited by the author. Source: OpenAI (September 2024)

On September 9, 2024, Palo Alto Networks' Unit 42 released a detailed threat assessment outlining the activities of various North Korean cyber threat groups operating under the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). The report highlights how these state-sponsored groups have targeted industries across the globe, deploying custom malware across Windows, macOS, and Linux platforms. This article delves into the key findings, detailing the tools, techniques, and groups involved in recent campaigns.

Introduction

The Lazarus Group has often been used as an umbrella term for North Korean threat actors in public reports. However, the Unit 42 report clarifies that multiple distinct groups operate under the RGB, each with its specific focus, ranging from financial theft to geopolitical disruption. Some notable threat groups mentioned include:

  • Alluring Pisces (APT38/Bluenoroff)
  • Gleaming Pisces (Citrine Sleet)
  • Jumpy Pisces (Andariel/Hidden Cobra)
  • Selective Pisces (TEMP.Hermit/ZINC)
  • Slow Pisces (TraderTraitor)
  • Sparkling Pisces (Kimsuky)

These groups have been active for over a decade, with significant campaigns such as the Sony Pictures hack in 2014 and the WannaCry ransomware outbreak in 2017. More recently, their focus has shifted toward the cryptocurrency sector, supply chain attacks, and espionage.

Report Overview

The Unit 42 threat assessment identifies 10 distinct malware families actively used by North Korean groups, many of which target macOS, Linux, and Windows systems. Below are key examples:

  1. RustBucket (macOS)
    • A backdoor malware, RustBucket uses a multi-stage infection chain that starts with an AppleScript file. The final payload, written in Rust, allows attackers to download and execute files and self-terminate the malware.
  2. KANDYKORN (macOS)
    • This malware follows a five-stage infection process, starting with a malicious ZIP file. Through reflective loading, it delivers the final payload, capable of data exfiltration and arbitrary command execution.
  3. SmoothOperator (macOS)
    • Deployed via a Trojanized version of the 3CX client application, SmoothOperator extracts sensitive data and executes follow-up payloads.
  4. OdicLoader (Linux)
    • This downloader uses a Unicode trick to masquerade as a PDF file. It was observed in the 2023 Operation DreamJob campaign.
  5. Comebacker (Windows)
    • Distributed through malicious PyPI packages, Comebacker communicates with its C2 server, allowing attackers to exfiltrate data and execute payloads.

Insights and Analysis

The activities of these North Korean groups have significant geopolitical and financial implications. By targeting cryptocurrency exchanges, defense contractors, and critical infrastructure, these actors pose a persistent and evolving threat. Their ability to adapt malware to different platforms further complicates detection and prevention efforts.

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Organizations across the globe, particularly those in financial services, technology, and defence, remain at heightened risk due to the global nature of these campaigns.

There are several key defensive measures to protect against these threat actors. Their Cortex XDR platform provides a multi-layered defense, detecting and preventing malware from groups like Alluring Pisces and Sparkling Pisces. Behavioural threat protection, combined with malware analysis and Advanced DNS Security, can help identify malicious activity before it can cause damage.

North Korean cyber actors continue to be a formidable force, with their sophisticated malware arsenal posing risks to industries worldwide. For organizations looking to improve their defences:

  1. User awareness training with an emphasis on self-reporting
  2. Implementing behavioral analytics to detect unusual activity patterns.
  3. Deploying endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions to prevent the execution of unknown malware.
  4. Regularly updating security configurations and conducting vulnerability assessments.

Indicators of Compromise (IOC)

IndicatorTypeDescription
c9a7b42c7b29ca948160f95f017e9e9ae781f3b981ecf6edbac943e52c63ffc8SHA256 HashRustBucket malware hash
c7f4aa77be7f7afe9d0665d3e705dbf7794bc479bb9c44488c7bf4169f8d14feSHA256 HashRustBucket malware hash
3ea2ead8f3cec030906dcbffe3efd5c5d77d5d375d4a54cca03bfe8a6cb59940SHA256 HashSUGARLOADER malware hash
23.254.226[.]90IP AddressSUGARLOADER associated IP
2360a69e5fd7217e977123c81d3dbb60bf4763a9dae6949bc1900234f7762df1SHA256 HashHLOADER malware hash
689cfaa9319f3f7529a31472ecf6b2e0ca6891b736de009e0b6c2ebac958cc94SHA256 HashHLOADER malware hash
c6a48365c3db9761bd60981bdcdd87aced23d8e60067caa30fee501bf4b47b84SHA256 HashHLOADER malware hash
a03d13c9825e150810e6e6aaf053d71ec5a53b86581414dd982a74d4a8bc5475SHA256 HashHLOADER malware hash
927b3564c1cf884d2a05e1d7bd24362ce8563a1e9b85be776190ab7f8af192f6SHA256 HashKANDYKORN malware hash
e6bbc33815b9f20b0cf832d7401dd893fbc467c800728b5891336706da0dbcecSHA256 HashSmoothOperator (malicious 3CX DMG)
a64fa9f1c76457ecc58402142a8728ce34ccba378c17318b3340083eeb7acc67SHA256 HashSmoothOperator (libffmpeg.dylib)
479038eb12ed07893ee0dcc04fbdcf182489bbb271f5a4f90f83874881a80ce3SHA256 HashSmoothOperator (libffmpeg.dylib)
2546d239a262c24a6f8ea01d890cbc459a22db79b379b6ec3b24fbb56efb5381SHA256 HashSmoothOperator (libffmpeg.dylib)
5009c7d1590c1f8c05827122172583ddf924c53b55a46826abf66da46725505aSHA256 HashSmoothOperator (libffmpeg.dylib)
87c5d0c93b80acf61d24e7aaf0faae231ab507ca45483ad3d441b5d1acebc43cSHA256 HashSmoothOperator (libffmpeg.dylib)
99dbc6fe3c3e465052fcefa1642861747dc9e069eeb244589b605bd710b1e0d1SHA256 HashSmoothOperator (libffmpeg.dylib)
fee4f9dabc094df24d83ec1a8c4e4ff573e5d9973caa676f58086c99561382d7SHA256 HashSmoothOperator (libffmpeg.dylib)
7667d1b8fcc4f712084e3e3f8b4ab505ab150c52aea7b219249ec508b4b0e224SHA256 HashSmoothOperator (libffmpeg.dylib)
6c121f2b2efa6592c2c22b29218157ec9e63f385e7a1d7425857d603ddef8c59SHA256 HashUpdateAgent malware hash
msstorageazure[.]comDomainDomain used by UpdateAgent
officestoragebox[.]comDomainDomain used by UpdateAgent
visualstudiofactory[.]comDomainDomain used by UpdateAgent
azuredeploystore[.]comDomainDomain used by UpdateAgent
msstorageboxes[.]comDomainDomain used by UpdateAgent
officeaddons[.]comDomainDomain used by UpdateAgent
sourceslabs[.]comDomainDomain used by UpdateAgent
zacharryblogs[.]comDomainDomain used by UpdateAgent
pbxcloudeservices[.]comDomainDomain used by UpdateAgent
pbxphonenetwork[.]comDomainDomain used by UpdateAgent
akamaitechcloudservices[.]comDomainDomain used by UpdateAgent
azureonlinestorage[.]comDomainDomain used by UpdateAgent
msedgepackageinfo[.]comDomainDomain used by UpdateAgent
glcloudservice[.]comDomainDomain used by UpdateAgent
pbxsources[.]comDomainDomain used by UpdateAgent
sbmsa[.]wikiDomainDomain used by UpdateAgent
8bfa4fe0534c0062393b6a2597c3491f7df3bf2eabfe06544c53bdf1f38db6d4SHA256 HashObjCShellz malware hash
15d53bb839e00405a34a8b690ec181f5555fc4f891b8248ae7fa72bad28315a9SHA256 HashObjCShellz malware hash
f1713afaf5958bdf3e975ebbab8245a98a84e03f8ce52175ef1568de208116e0SHA256 HashObjCShellz malware hash
swissborg[.]blogDomainDomain used by ObjCShellz
081804b491c70bfa63ecdbe9fd4618d3570706ad8b71dba13e234069648e5e48SHA256 HashFullhouse backdoor hash
contortonset[.]comDomainDomain used by Fullhouse backdoor
relysudden[.]comDomainDomain used by Fullhouse backdoor
primerosauxiliosperu[.]comDomainDomain used by Fullhouse backdoor
rentedpushy[.]comDomainDomain used by Fullhouse backdoor
basketsalute[.]comDomainDomain used by Fullhouse backdoor
prontoposer[.]comDomainDomain used by Fullhouse backdoor
146.19.173[.]125IP AddressFullhouse backdoor associated IP
23.227.202[.]54IP AddressFullhouse backdoor associated IP
38.132.124[.]88IP AddressFullhouse backdoor associated IP
88.119.174[.]148IP AddressFullhouse backdoor associated IP
198.244.135[.]250IP AddressFullhouse backdoor associated IP
f3b0da965a4050ab00fce727bb31e0f889a9c05d68d777a8068cfc15a71d3703SHA256 HashPOOLRAT malware hash
5c907b722c53a5be256dc5f96b755bc9e0b032cc30973a52d984d4174bace456SHA256 HashPOOLRAT malware hash
5e40d106977017b1ed235419b1e59ff090e1f43ac57da1bb5d80d66ae53b1df8SHA256 HashPOOLRAT malware hash
www.talesseries[.]com/write.phpURLPOOLRAT malware C2 URL
rgedist[.]com/sfxl.phpURL

MITRE ATT&CK Table

TacticTechniqueIDDescription
ExecutionUser ExecutionT1204RustBucket and OdicLoader use user execution to trick victims into running malware.
PersistenceBoot or Logon Autostart ExecutionT1547HLOADER uses persistence techniques by replacing or renaming applications like Discord.
Defense EvasionMasqueradingT1036OdicLoader masquerades as a PDF using Unicode to evade detection.
Command and ControlApplication Layer ProtocolT1071.001Comebacker uses HTTP for communication with its command and control server.
CollectionData from Local SystemT1005SmoothOperator collects sensitive data from infected systems.

References

Threat Assessment: North Korean Threat Groups
Explore Unit 42’s review of North Korean APT groups and their impact, detailing the top 10 malware and tools we’ve seen from these threat actors. Explore Unit 42’s review of North Korean APT groups and their impact, detailing the top 10 malware and tools we’ve seen from these threat actors.